Planning and preparation

1Why this matters

People who deny the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi often claim that the killings were a spontaneous reaction to the death of President Habyarimana. The evidence shows the opposite: the crime was prepared over months and years. Learning to recognise that evidence is part of fighting denial.

2Evidence of planning

1. Militias were created and trained. The ruling MRND party's youth wing became the Interahamwe militia, and the CDR party formed its own militia, the Impuzamugambi. From 1992 their members received military training.
2. Weapons were distributed. Firearms and grenades were handed to militias and to "civil self-defence" groups organised through local government. Large numbers of machetes were imported in 1993.
3. Lists were prepared of Tutsi and of Hutu opponents to be targeted.
4. Hate propaganda was organised. Kangura (from 1990) and RTLM (from July 1993) were run by people close to the regime. In November 1992, at Kabaya, the MRND official Léon Mugesera gave a speech calling Tutsi foreigners who should be sent back "to Ethiopia". A Rwandan court later sentenced him to life imprisonment for inciting genocide.
5. Earlier massacres served as rehearsals. Local authorities organised killings of Tutsi at Kibilira (1990), of the Bagogwe (1991) and in Bugesera (1992), and learned how to mobilise people. None of the organisers was punished.
6. The Arusha Agreement was sabotaged. From late 1993 a movement calling itself "Hutu Power" split the opposition parties and rejected power-sharing.

3Warnings that were ignored

In January 1994 an informant inside the Interahamwe told UNAMIR, the UN peacekeeping force, about hidden weapons and a plan to exterminate Tutsi. On 11 January 1994 the force commander, General Roméo Dallaire, sent a coded cable to UN headquarters in New York asking permission to seize the weapons. He was told not to act.

4The trigger

On the evening of 6 April 1994, the plane carrying President Habyarimana and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi was shot down as it approached Kigali airport. A Rwandan committee of inquiry reported in 2010 that the missiles were fired from Kanombe military camp, which the government army controlled. Within hours, roadblocks had been set up in Kigali, and the killing of Tutsi and of political opponents began that night and the next morning. A plan of this scale cannot be put into action in a few hours unless it has already been prepared: the crash was the pretext, not the cause.

Worked example: evaluating a claim of denial

Claim: "The killings were an unplanned reaction of anger to the president's death."

The evidence contradicts this. Militias had been trained since 1992; weapons had been distributed and machetes imported in 1993; lists of targets existed; RTLM had been broadcasting hatred since July 1993; and UNAMIR had been warned of an extermination plan in January 1994. Roadblocks appeared within hours of the crash. An unplanned reaction could not be organised so fast across the whole country. The claim is a form of denial.

Practice

Solution. The Interahamwe (MRND) and the Impuzamugambi (CDR).

Solution. He asked permission to seize hidden weapons after being warned of a plan to exterminate Tutsi. He was told not to act.

Solution. The trigger, or pretext, was the shooting down of the president's plane on 6 April 1994. The causes were the long-term conditions and the deliberate planning described in lessons 1 and 2.

Solution. Local authorities practised mobilising people to kill Tutsi, and because no one was punished they learned that such killing carried no cost.