German Unification, Bismarck, and Italy Compared

1The source: "iron and blood"

On 30 September 1862, a week after King Wilhelm I appointed him Minister-President of Prussia, Otto von Bismarck spoke to the budget committee of the Prussian parliament. Parliament was refusing to pay for the king's army reforms. The committee's record of his words includes this passage:

"Germany does not look to Prussia's liberalism, but to its power. Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden may indulge in liberalism, but no one will give them Prussia's role for that. Prussia must gather its strength and hold it together for the favourable moment, which has already been missed several times. Prussia's borders under the treaties of Vienna are not favourable to a healthy political life. The great questions of the day are not decided by speeches and majority resolutions (that was the great mistake of 1848 and 1849) but by iron and blood."

Bismarck to the budget committee of the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, 30 September 1862. Translated by Ganzaa from the German text of the committee's record.

This is Bismarck's programme in one paragraph. Unity would come through Prussian power, not liberal ideals; the failure of the Frankfurt Parliament in 1848 and 1849 proved that debates could not make Germany; and "iron and blood", meaning armies and war, would decide. Notice too what the source is: a record kept by the committee, partly in reported speech, of a speech that shocked liberals. Its famous phrase was quickly turned around into "blood and iron".

2Why German unity was delayed

• Austria. Austria presided over the German Confederation and would not accept a Germany it did not lead; in 1850, at Olmütz, it forced Prussia to abandon its own plan for a union.
• Particularism. Thirty-nine states, each with its own ruler, army and court; the southern kingdoms of Bavaria and Württemberg in particular feared Prussian domination.
• Religion and region. The south was largely Catholic and looked to Catholic Austria; Prussia and the north were largely Protestant.
• Failure of 1848 and 1849. The Frankfurt Parliament wrote a constitution and offered the crown to Frederick William IV of Prussia in 1849, but he refused a crown offered by an elected assembly.
• The great powers. France and Russia both preferred a divided Germany on their borders.
• Division among nationalists over a small Germany or a greater Germany, and over a liberal or an authoritarian state.

3What made it possible

• Economic unity first. The Zollverein, railways and the coal and iron of the Rhineland made Prussia the economic leader of Germany and tied the smaller states to it.
• A modern army. The reforms of Roon and the staff planning of Moltke, with breech-loading rifles and the use of railways, gave Prussia the best army in Europe.
• Bismarck's diplomacy. Before each war he isolated the enemy.
• International conditions. After the Crimean War Austria had lost Russia's friendship; Britain did not intervene on the continent; Napoleon III misjudged Prussia's strength.
• Nationalism. German writers, scholars and gymnastic and singing societies spread the idea of one German nation.

4The stages and Bismarck's role

5Italy and Germany compared

The two processes were also linked: the same wars moved both forward. Austria's defeat in 1866 gave Italy Venetia and gave Prussia the leadership of Germany; France's defeat in 1870 gave Italy Rome and gave Germany its empire.